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U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

FILE:

Office: CHICAGO, IL

Date: JUN 03 2004

IN RE:

PETITION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

**INSTRUCTIONS:**

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Chicago, Illinois, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured entry into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is married to a legal permanent resident of the United States and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), in order to remain in the United States with her spouse and children.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the District Director*, dated September 20, 2002.

On appeal, counsel asserts that extreme hardship is established where the applicant's spouse would be deprived of the mother of his three legal children. Counsel also contends that the fact that the applicant was paroled into the country is evidence in favor of an exercise of the Attorney General's [Secretary of Homeland Security's] discretion. *Brief in Support of Appeal*, dated August 26, 2003.

The record contains a declaration of the applicant's spouse, dated November 1, 2001; a copy and translation of the marriage certificate of the applicant and her spouse and copies and translations of the birth certificates of the applicant's children. The entire record was reviewed and considered in rendering this decision.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

The record reflects that, on January 6, 1999, the applicant made a willful misrepresentation of a material fact upon entry to the United States by presenting a document that did not belong to her.

A section 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to

section 212(i) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is that suffered by the applicant's husband. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560, 565-566 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Bureau of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Counsel contends that the applicant's spouse would suffer extreme hardship as a result of departing from the United States as Nicaragua is an "extremely poor country" and notes that the unemployment rate there is between 40 and 50%. *Attachment to Form I-290B, Answer to Question 3*, dated September 20, 2002. Counsel further posits that the applicant's spouse would be unable to obtain adequate educational opportunities for his children in Nicaragua and that 20% of the children between the ages of six and nine in Nicaragua work. *Id.*

Although counsel offers evidence of extreme hardship to the applicant's husband if he relocates to Nicaragua, counsel does not establish extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse if he remains in the United States maintaining his employment and access to educational opportunities for his children. Counsel asserts that it is extreme hardship to deprive the applicant's spouse of the mother of his children. While the AAO sympathizes with the plight of the applicant's spouse, separation is a common result of deportation and the record does not establish that the situation imposes extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse within the meaning of section 212(i) of the Act.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's husband will endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, if he remains in the United States, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship based on the record.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant

statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.